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Abstract The role of board secretaries is a unique insti-
tutional feature in China. Individuals in this senior execu-
tive role are responsible for coordinating information
disclosure. We study the impact of board secretaries on
management earnings forecasts and find that their legal
expertise, accounting expertise and foreign experience help
improve management earnings forecast quality. The quality
of forecasts, as indicated by their occurrence, frequency,
precision and accuracy, is also positively associated with
the role duality (e.g. board director, CFO or other senior
executive role) and equity holdings of board secretaries and
negatively associated with their political connection. The
quality of forecasts is found to increase the compensation
of board secretaries. Finally, we show that the equity
holding of board secretaries reduces litigation risks and
increases corporate philanthropic giving.
Keywords Board secretary  Management earnings
forecasts  China  Top management team  Litigation risk
JEL classification G30  M12  M41
Introduction
Managers often release earnings forecasts prior to the
actual earnings announcement to show their ability to
anticipate economic environment changes and adjust pro-
duction plans (Trueman 1986). Various characteristics of a
top management team (TMT) influence the style of man-
agement earnings forecasts (Bamber et al. 2010). The lit-
erature largely examines the roles of Chief Financial
Officer (Geiger and North 2006; Jiang et al. 2010), Chief
Counsel1 (Bird et al. 2015; Hopkins et al. 2014; Kwak et al.
2012), Chief Risk Officer (Adabo et al. 2005), Chief
Knowledge Officer (Earl and Scott 1999) and Chief Mar-
keting Officer (Nath and Mahajan 2008).2 The Company
Law of the People’s Republic of China requires listed
companies to establish a board secretary post to coordinate
information disclosure and board meetings from the
beginning of 2006. The role of board secretaries has not
been studied in the literature, and we intend to shed light on
this area by examining how they influence management
earnings forecasts.
Although board secretaries in China and company sec-
retaries in other countries share responsibilities for coor-
dinating boards and executives, managing internal
information flow and ensuring regulatory compliance,3
board secretaries are also responsible for information dis-
closure and organisations’ relationships with their inves-
tors. Since managers’ personal characteristics are found to
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influence management earnings forecasts (Bamber et al.
2010), we expect that professional expertise could influ-
ence the professional ability of board secretaries in ful-
filling their earnings forecasts duties. Board secretaries
with legal expertise are better aware of litigation risks and
tend to make fair forecasts to reduce information asym-
metry (Kwak et al. 2012). Board secretaries with an
accounting background have good knowledge of firms’
financial situation and can make more accurate forecasts.
Board secretaries with international experience tend to
possess knowledge about more advanced legal institutions
and better corporate governance (Duan and Hou 2016;
Giannetti et al. 2013) and are therefore expected to
improve the quality of management earnings forecasts.
Political connection is another important manager
characteristic in China. Since politically connected man-
agers are likely to establish management entrenchment in
firms, they are less likely to be replaced, decreasing their
incentive to improve firm performance (Cao et al. 2011;
You and Du 2012). In addition, politically connected
managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may pursue
social objectives rather than the maximisation of share-
holders’ wealth (Fan et al. 2007). Politically connected
board secretaries tend to former bureaucrats who lack
business knowledge and experience. We therefore expect
that politically connected board secretaries, measured as
those with Communist Party membership, are likely to
issue low-quality forecasts.
Role duality for board secretaries is common. Many
board secretaries also serve as a board member, CFO or
other senior executive. Role duality may lead to informa-
tion advantage, more power (Finkelstein 1992) and stron-
ger leadership (Finkelstein and D’aveni 1994). We expect
that board secretaries holding dual roles are able to access
more information and resources, leading to high-quality
management earnings forecasts.
Finally, managerial ownership can align the interests of
managers and shareholders and mitigate agency problems
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Datta et al. 2005). For
example, Nagar et al. (2003) show that alignment of CEO
Table 1 Summary of studies of non-CEO top managers
Authors Types of top manager Sample Main findings
Geiger and
North
(2006)
Chief Financial Officer 712 US companies from
1994 to 2000
The newly appointment CFO in this study is associated with
lower discretionary accruals, especially if it is an external
appointment
Jiang et al.
(2010)
Chief Financial Officer S&P 1500 firms in the
US from 1993 to 2006
The magnitude of accruals and the likelihood of beating analysts’
forecasts are more sensitive to CFO equity incentives than to
those of the CEO
Barua et al.
(2010)
Chief Financial Officer 2938 US firms from
2004 to 2005
Female CFOs have lower performance-matched absolute
discretionary accruals and lower absolute accrual estimation
errors
Beck and
Mauldin
(2014)
Chief Financial Officer US firms from 2006 to
2009
During the recession, the presence of more powerful CFOs is
associated with larger audit fee reductions, and the presence of a
more powerful audit committee is associated with lower audit
fee reductions
Bird et al.
(2008)
Chief Counsel (also known as
Chief Legal Officer or General
Counsel)
S&P 500 firms in the
US from 2000 to 2010
Chief Counsel tend to have lower compensation when the
preceding year’s Tobin’s Q is high and firms have more insiders
on their boards. In addition, lawsuits are positively correlated
with CEO and CFO turnover but not CLO turnover
Hopkins
et al.
(2014)
Chief Counsel 2133 US firms in
ExecuComp from
2001 to 2011
Chief Counsels with high compensation are associated with lower
quality financial reports and more aggressive accounting
practices, including management of the litigation reserve
Kwak et al.
(2012)
Chief Counsel S&P 1500 US firms
from 1997 to 2009
Firms with a Chief Counsel in top management are more likely to
issue forecasts, particularly bad news forecasts, than other firms
Earl and
Scott
(1999)
Chief Knowledge Officer Theoretical Paper Companies are creating the CKO position to initiate, drive and
coordinate knowledge management programs
Nath and
Mahajan
(2008)
Chief Marketing Officer 167 US firms from 2000
to 2004
The presence of a CMO is associated with innovation,
differentiation, branding strategy, diversification, TMT
functional experience in marketing and external CEOs
Aabo et al.
(2005)
Chief Risk Officer Hydro One, a Canadian
electric utility
company
The process of implementation a CRO has helped make risk
awareness an important part of the corporate culture
L. Xing et al.
123
and shareholders’ interests increases the frequency of
management earnings forecasts. We therefore predict that
board secretaries with more equity holdings are more
willing to serve the interests of shareholders and issue
high-quality management forecasts.
To test our four predictions, we collect the characteris-
tics of board secretaries between 2001 and 2011 from their
biographies. We use this sample to examine the impact of
board secretaries on the occurrence, frequency, precision,
accuracy and optimism of management earnings forecasts.
The results support our predictions: the quality of man-
agement earnings forecasts are positively associated with
the expertise, role duality and equity holdings of board
secretaries, but negatively associated with their political
connection. We further find that board secretaries with
accounting expertise, dual senior roles and equity holding
are more likely to issue bad news and downward guidance
forecasts, which help reduce legal and reputational risks.
We also investigate the influence of management earnings
forecasts on corporate decisions regarding board secre-
taries’ pay and turnover, finding that board secretaries who
issue high-quality earnings forecasts tend to receive higher
compensation and have more stable job retention. Finally,
we perform additional analyses to examine the board sec-
retaries’ impact on corporate policy and find that equity
holding of board secretaries reduces firms’ litigation risk
and increases corporate social responsibility. Overall, the
results suggest the important role of board secretaries in
management earnings forecasts.
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways.
First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on
board secretaries, opening a new research avenue for TMT
studies. It also complements the existing literature on the
roles of Chief Financial Officer (Geiger and North 2006;
Jiang et al. 2010), Chief Counsel (Bird et al. 2015; Hopkins
et al. 2014; Kwak et al. 2012), Chief Risk Officer (Adabo
et al. 2005), Chief Knowledge Officer (Earl and Scott
1999) and Chief Marketing Officer (Nath and Mahajan
2008).
Second, this paper adds to the management forecast
literature by documenting a new managerial determinant.
The existing literature reports the impact of the demo-
graphic characteristics of top managers, including CEOs,
CFOs and Chief Counsel, on firms’ forecasting decisions
(Bamber et al. 2010; Brochet et al. 2011; Baik et al. 2011;
Kwak et al. 2012; Cassell et al. 2013). We provide original
evidence that the quality of management earnings forecasts
is related to professional expertise, political connections,
role duality and equity holdings of board secretaries.
Third, this paper contributes to studies of managerial
effects on business ethics (Chen et al. 2016; Lee 2015;
Rogers and Stocken 2005; Slater and Dixon-Fowler 2009).
Since high-quality information disclosure is a fundamental
element of ethical communication (Holley 1998; Ruppel
and Harrington 2000), management earnings forecasts play
a key role in investor protection. Ethical managers should
provide high-quality forecast information to stakeholders.
In addition, we show the impact of board secretaries on
litigation risks and corporate social responsibility.
This study has important policy implications for regu-
lators and policy makers in China who aim to establish an
effective governance mechanism within the particular
context of China. Our results suggest that certain require-
ments regarding the expertise and ownership of board
secretaries will be helpful in enhancing management
forecasts. In addition, firms can consider appointing a
board member or senior executive as board secretary.
Taking on a second role can actually help increase forecast
quality and will not lead to a busyness problem.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 introduces the institutional background. Sec-
tion 3 reviews the related literature and develops the
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample and the
research design. Section 5 presents the empirical results,
Sect. 6 performs additional analyses, and Sect. 7
concludes.
Institutional Background
The top management team (TMT) is a group of individuals
who manage the daily operations of companies at the
highest level. Top management teams typically include the
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer
(CFO), Chief Technology Officer (CTO), Chief Operations
Officer (COO), Chief Marketing Officer (CMO), Chief
Counsels, and Chief Risk Officer (CRO).
A unique corporate governance mechanism in China,
the board secretary is a post that is required by law to be
present in top management teams. Board secretaries play a
key role by being in charge of corporate information dis-
closure, as specified in the Guidance for the Articles of
Listed Company (1997), Company Law of the People’s
Republic of China (2005). The Rules Governing the Listing
of Stocks on Shanghai Stock Exchange (2008) and the
Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shenzhen Stock
Exchange (2008) further strengthen board secretaries’
information disclosure duties by stating that ‘‘a listed
company must establish an information disclosure depart-
ment and put the board secretary to manage this depart-
ment’’; ‘‘the board secretary is responsible for disclosing
material information to the public, coordinating informa-
tion disclosure matters, establishing standardised informa-
tion disclosure systems and urging other managers to
observe relevant disclosure regulations’’; and ‘‘the board
secretary is responsible for disclosing corporate
Do Board Secretaries Influence Management Earnings Forecasts?
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information in a timely manner, ensuring confidentiality
with regard to information disclosures and reporting to the
stock exchange whenever any non-published material
information is leaked.’’4
Board secretaries have other important obligations. For
example, (1) board secretaries are responsible for ensuring
corporate decisions comply with laws and regulations by
providing professional legal advice to management; (2)
they educate other managers about the latest rules and
regulations on information disclosure; (3) they act as a
liaison between firms and different regulatory agencies,
such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CRSC), the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges and
local securities authorities; and (4) they answer the con-
sulting calls of investors, communicate with media repor-
ters and assist securities analysts in their investigations.
Overall, board secretaries perform multiple duties in
management and operations to improve information dis-
closure and corporate governance.
The concept of Chinese board secretaries is originated
from company secretaries in Western countries. Although
individuals in both roles serve as senior executives in
charge of issues such as the provision of legal assistance,
safekeeping of business documents and maintaining con-
tact with investors, Chinese board secretaries differ greatly
from company secretaries in certain aspects. Since the
Model Business Corporation Act of 1984 granted American
companies the discretion to specify titles and duties for
their management team members, the power of the original
role has diminished. For instance, CEOs and CFOs are
usually responsible for the release of corporate information
to the public, General Counsels often act as a liaison
between firms and regulators and Chief Compliance Offi-
cers have a responsibility to ensure legal compliance. A
major difference is that Chinese board secretaries report
directly to boards of directors, whereas company secre-
taries report to General Counsels or CEOs. As Chinese
board secretaries undertake legal and regulatory duties and
consequently expose themselves to more litigation risks
arising from irresponsible forecast disclosure, Chinese
board secretaries play a more important role in information
disclosure than company secretaries in other countries.
Since they report directly to corporate boards, they are
expected to safeguard the interests of shareholders.
Management earnings forecasts issued by Chinese listed
firms differ from those disclosed by US firms in two ways.
First, Chinese firms can decide whether to issue earnings
forecasts based on the difference between their current
predictions about future earnings and the actual earnings in
the corresponding period of the previous year, while
American firms make forecast decisions based on the
deviation of the market expectations regarding their future
earnings from their own predictions. The difference is
caused by the underdeveloped role of financial analysts in
the Chinese stock market. Second, Chinese listed firms
normally issue management forecasts on future net profits,
whereas public firms in the USA often issue management
forecasts of future earnings per share (EPS).
Literature and Hypothesis Development
Related Literature
The literature shows that top managers influence manage-
ment earnings forecasts. Baik et al. (2011) document the
positive relationship between CEO ability and the likeli-
hood, frequency and accuracy of management earnings
forecasts. Stock markets respond more strongly to earnings
forecasts issued by high-ability CEOs, which suggests that
management earnings forecasts communicate information
regarding CEOs’ ability to the market. Cassell et al. (2013)
show that retiring CEOs are more likely to issue earnings
forecasts in the final year of their tenure, and those final
year forecasts are more likely to contain good news. This
result is stronger when CEOs receive high equity holdings
and when CEOs cut final year spending in R&D and capital
expenditure, implying that retiring CEOs tend to manage
final year earnings forecasts for their self-serving benefits.
Kwak et al. (2012) find that Chief Counsels play an
important role in forecast disclosures. Firms with a General
Counsel in management are more likely to issue earnings
forecasts, and their forecasts tend to be less optimistic and
more accurate. They further show that the influence of
General Counsels on forecast disclosures is more signifi-
cant when the General Counsel also holds the role of
company secretary or receives higher compensation.
The literature also documents the link between man-
agement styles and voluntary disclosure of earnings fore-
casts. Bamber et al. (2010) find that top managers exhibit
idiosyncrasies to a significant degree in earnings forecast
disclosures. Managers’ styles regarding earnings forecast
disclosure are associated with their career path, age cohort,
military experience, education and legal background.
Similarly, Brochet et al. (2011) find that firms hiring new
CEOs with previous forecasting experience are more likely
to issue earnings forecasts. Among firms that have histor-
ically issued earnings forecasts, they document that a
temporary break in forecast issuance follows CFO turn-
over, and that subsequent forecasts disclosed by a newly
appointed CFO tend to be less precise, due to the CFO’s
inexperience in the firm or industry.4 Source: http://english.sse.com.cn/laws/framework/ and http://www.
szse.cn/main/en/RulesandRegulations/SZSERules/GeneralRules/.
L. Xing et al.
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The literature indicates that managers are likely to
strategically manage earnings forecasts for their self-serv-
ing benefit. Cheng and Lo (2006) report that managers who
plan to buy their firm’s stocks issue more bad news fore-
casts to decrease the purchase price, while managers who
plan to sell their firm’s stocks do not change their fore-
casting strategy, due to the higher litigation risk associated
with insider sales. CEO insider trading has a bigger influ-
ence on disclosure than insider trading in general. Like-
wise, Cheng et al. (2013) find a positive (negative)
relationship between forecast news and forecast precision
before managers sell (buy) their firm’s stocks, suggesting
that managers issue good news forecasts with high (low)
precision before insider sales (purchases). They also reveal
that managers are less inclined to strategically manage
forecast precision when large institutional investors exist or
when their forecasting behaviour poses great litigation risk,
and they are more likely to manage precision when that
precision cannot be assessed by investors.
Previous research supports the notion that management
earnings forecast outcomes also have implications for
individual managers. Trueman (1986) reports that investors
use management forecast quality to evaluate managers’
ability to adjust production plans according to foreseeable
changes in the business environment. Lee et al. (2012) find
that inaccurate management earnings forecasts result in the
replacement of CEOs in firms with poor earnings perfor-
mance. This implies that boards of directors in these firms
use management earnings forecast accuracy to evaluate
CEOs’ ability in uncertain business environments when
making decisions on CEO replacement. The relation
between management earnings forecast accuracy and CEO
turnover is more pronounced among firms with less
entrenched CEOs.
Hypothesis Development: Expertise
Research in corporate governance has long focused on the
effects of top managers’ demographic characteristics on
corporate financial performance (Nelson 2005; Kaplan
et al. 2012). Bamber et al. (2010) show that top managers’
personal characteristics, including age, education and
functional experience, influence management earnings
forecasts. Since board secretaries are top management team
members and are legally responsible for information dis-
closure by law, we argue that their demographic charac-
teristics affect their competence in improving management
forecasts. Specifically, we expect that board secretaries’
legal background, accounting background and international
experience could influence their firms’ earnings forecast
policies.
Board secretaries with legal expertise are more sensitive
to litigation risks associated with information asymmetry,
and they are more likely to have more of an intention to
improve, rather than stating it outright. Furthermore, since
board secretaries with legal expertise are more capable of
advising other managers on issues related to legislative and
regulatory compliance, they can in turn improve firms’
overall risk management and information disclosure qual-
ity. In addition, the issuance of earnings forecasts requires
accounting knowledge. Board secretaries with accounting
expertise can better understand the financial conditions of
firms and more accurately predict future earnings.
International expertise has been identified as an impor-
tant managerial characteristic. Chinese returnee managers
have opportunities to learn about more advanced legal
institutions and superior management practices during their
overseas experience (Duan and Hou 2016; Cumming et al.
2016a, b). Giannetti et al. (2013) provide evidence that
board directors with international experience transfer the
advanced governance and management knowledge they
acquire abroad to Chinese firms, which leads to the
improved corporate governance and earnings performance
of those local firms. In addition, managers’ international
experience is found to improve corporate performance
(Carpenter et al. 2001) and corporate social performance
(Slater and Dixon-Fowler 2009). Therefore, we expect that
Chinese board secretaries with international work or study
experience are more likely to enhance the quality of
management earnings forecasts, and we propose H1 as
follows.
H1 The expertise of board secretaries (H1a: legal
expertise, H1b: accounting expertise, H1c: international
expertise) increases the quality of management earnings
forecasts.
Hypothesis Development: Political Connections
Politically connected managers in China have been found
to undermine firm performance (Fan et al. 2007) because
they lack business experience and tend to pursue social
objectives rather than maximising shareholder interest. In
addition, political connection brings privileges, such as job
security. In other words, it increases managerial entrench-
ment and undermines managers’ accountability (Cao et al.
2011; You and Du 2012). We therefore expect that polit-
ically connected board secretaries are less capable of
issuing high-quality forecasts, and we propose H2 as
follows.
H2 The political connection of board secretaries
decreases the quality of management earnings forecasts.
Do Board Secretaries Influence Management Earnings Forecasts?
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Hypothesis Development: Role Duality
Finkelstein (1992) measures the structural power of man-
agers by the number of official titles that they hold. He
notes that top managers’ ability to influence corporate
decisions is contingent on their power. We argue that board
secretaries holding other senior executive titles are able to
access more resources to provide high-quality management
earnings forecasts. Board secretaries often take on an
additional post of board director, CFO or another senior
executive role (e.g. vice-president).5
In terms of the additional roles, first, board directorship
could align the interests of board secretaries with share-
holders and consequently enhance forecast quality.
Organisation theory suggests that the consolidation of
management and board roles promotes unity of command
and leads to organisational effectiveness (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978; Donaldson and Davis 1991; Boyd
1990, 1995). Second, board secretaries who are also CFOs
have greater financial insight and can use this information
advantage to issue more accurate forecasts. Third, board
secretaries who hold other senior executive positions, such
as presidents and vice-presidents, tend to be extensively
involved in daily management and operation. Such expe-
rience and power help to enhance management earnings
forecasts. We hereby propose H3 as follows:
H3 The role duality of board secretaries (H3a: board
member, H3b: CFO, H3c: other senior executive role)
increases the quality of management earnings forecasts.
Hypothesis Development: Equity Holdings
Producing high-quality forecasts can be costly, and board
secretaries may choose to withhold information instead.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Datta et al. (2005) point
out that managerial equity holdings can alleviate agency
problems and facilitate managers’ incentive alignment with
investors (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Datta et al. 2005).
Nagar et al. (2003) find that CEOs tend to provide more
frequent management earnings forecasts when the interests
of CEOs and shareholders are aligned. Thus, we argue that
board secretaries’ equity holdings motivate them to reduce
information asymmetry by issuing high-quality manage-
ment earnings forecasts.
H4 The equity holding of board secretaries increases the
quality of management earnings forecasts.
Data and Research Design
Sample Selection
We hand-collect data on board secretary characteristics
from their biographical information in the China Securities
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database for
all listed firms on the Main Board of the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange between 2001 and 2012.6 We obtain manage-
ment earnings forecast data from the RESSET database.
We use both quarterly and annual management earnings
forecasts. Following Anilowski et al. (2007), we require
that a quarterly management forecast is issued prior to the
earnings announcement date of the forecast fiscal quarter
and no more than 90 days prior to the end of that fiscal
quarter. For annual forecasts, we require that the forecast is
issued prior to the earnings announcement date of the
forecast fiscal year and no more than 730 days prior to the
end of that fiscal year.
Table 1A summarises the definition and data sources of
all variables. After merging the management forecast data
with data on board secretary characteristics, corporate
governance and firm characteristics, the final sample con-
tains 6840 firm-year observations to conduct management
forecast occurrence and frequency analyses. The sample
contains 5362 firm-years that have at least one manage-
ment forecast issuance; these are used to analyse man-
agement forecast precision. When we examine
management forecast accuracy and optimism, the sample
size is further reduced to 4818 firm-years due to the
availability of data on actual earnings and stock prices.
Empirical Model
To examine the impact of board secretary characteristics on
the properties of management earnings forecasts, we use
the following regression model:
ForecastPropertyi;tþ1 ¼ b0þb1Expertisei:tþb2PartyMebi:t
þb3Dualityi:tþb4EquityHoldi:t
þ
X
bkControlsk;i;tþ ei;tþ1
ð1Þ
where i indexes firm and t indexes year. Forecast is one of
the management forecast properties: Occurrence, Fre-
quency, Precision, Accuracy and Optimism. Occurrence is
a dummy variable which is equal to one if there is at least
5 The literature documents the influence of CEOs, CFOs and General
Counsels on management earnings forecasts (Bamber et al. 2010;
Brochet et al. 2011; Baik et al. 2011; Kwak et al. 2012; Cassell et al.
2013).
6 Due to the workload of hand-collecting data, we only include firms
listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. We do not see any reason to
expect that the role of board secretaries in the Shanghai Stock
Exchange would be different. The sample starts from 2002 because
management earnings forecast data is available from 2002 in the
RESSET database.
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one management forecast issuance in a given firm-year,
and zero otherwise. Frequency is the total number of
forecasts issued by a firm in a given year. Precision is
coded as three if the forecast is a point forecast, two if it is
a range forecast, one if it is an open-interval forecast and
zero if it is a qualitative forecast. Accuracy is the absolute
difference between the management forecast of net profits
and the actual net profits, scaled by the market value of
tradable shares one day prior to the forecast release date,
and then multiplied by -1. A less negative value of Ac-
curacy indicates higher management forecast accuracy.
Optimism is coded as 1 if the management earnings fore-
cast is higher than the actual net profits (optimistic bias), 0
if it is equal to the actual net profits, and -1 if it is less than
the actual net profits (pessimistic bias). When firms issue
multiple forecasts in a year, we take their average values to
construct Precision, Accuracy and Optimism. We use point,
range and open-interval forecasts to construct Accuracy
and Optimism. For range forecasts, the midpoint of the
range is used as the management forecast estimate (Kross
et al. 2011). For open-interval forecasts, the value provided
in the open-interval forecast is taken as the management
forecast estimate (Yang 2012; Cassell et al. 2013).
We examine whether and how the properties of man-
agement earnings forecasts are affected by board secretary
characteristics, including professional background, politi-
cal connections, role duality and equity holdings. We
construct three background variables for Expertise. Law is
a dummy variable, equal to one if a board secretary holds a
law licence, and zero otherwise. Accounting is a dummy
variable, equal to one if a board secretary holds a profes-
sional certificate in accounting, and zero otherwise. For-
eignExp is coded as 1 if a board secretary has work or study
experience in foreign countries, 0.5 if she/he has work
experience in Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan, and 0
otherwise. Following Li et al. (2008), we use Chinese
Communist Party membership to measure the political
connection of board secretaries. PartyMeb is a binary
indicator suggesting the existence of a board secretary’s
political connection, which equals one if the secretary is a
member of the Chinese Communist Party, and zero
otherwise.
We also examine three forms of board secretary duality.
Duality is proxied by Board_Duality, CFO_Duality and
Mag_Duality. Board_Duality is a dummy variable, equal
to one if a board secretary is a member of the firm’s board
of directors, and zero otherwise. CFO_Duality is a dummy
variable, equal to one if a board secretary serves as the
firm’s CFO, and zero otherwise. Mag_Duality is a dummy
variable, equal to one if a board secretary holds an addi-
tional non-accounting senior executive position in the firm,
and zero otherwise. Finally, we examine the effect of the
equity holdings of board secretaries on management fore-
cast properties. The equity holdings of board secretaries are
calculated as the change in value of the secretary’s stock-
holdings given a 1% increase in the firm’s stock prices
(Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006).
EquityHold is defined as the natural logarithm of one plus
the equity holdings.
In our regressions, we control for other board secretary
demographic characteristics. Female is a dummy variable,
equal to one if a board secretary is female, and zero
otherwise. Age is the age of a board secretary. Ln(Tenure)
is the natural logarithm of the number of days that a board
secretary has held this position. If the board secretary was
replaced during a firm-year, we use the characteristics of
the board secretary holding the position at the year-end to
construct these variables.
We also control for corporate governance characteris-
tics, as prior research finds evidence suggesting that better
corporate governance improves management forecast
quality (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Ajinkya et al. 2005).
Table 2 Descriptive statistics on management earnings forecasts
Annual forecasts Quarterly forecasts Overall forecasts Difference in
mean (annual–
quarterly)
Difference in
median (annual–
quarterly)Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Precision 2.115 2.000 0.491 2.122 2.000 0.484 2.119 2.000 0.486 -0.007 (-0.85) 0.000 (-0.79)
Accuracy -30.208 -6.286 194.423 -8.409 -2.204 33.356 -15.820 -3.151 117.000 -21.799***
(-10.78)
-4.081***
(-35.22)
Optimism 0.093 1.000 0.996 -0.049 -1.000 0.999 -0.001 -1.000 1.000 0.142*** (8.23) 2.000*** (8.21)
Horizon 128.531 142.000 63.114 59.553 60.000 39.384 83.010 73.000 58.700 68.978***
(81.65)
82.000***
(65.58)
#Obs. 9801 5049 14,850
This table presents descriptive statistics for management earnings forecasts issued during 2002–2012. The t statistics for difference in mean and
the Wilcoxon z-statistics for difference in median are presented in brackets. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Variable
definitions are provided in Table A.1
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics on variables
Variable #Obs. Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max
Annual Management Forecasts
Occurrence 6840 0.654 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Frequency 6840 0.850 0.750 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 3.000
Precision 4471 1.827 0.804 0.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 3.000
Accuracy 3839 -21.150 45.070 -311.700 -18.360 -6.511 -2.387 -0.054
Optimism 3839 0.077 0.946 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Ln(Horizon) 4462 4.759 0.530 2.398 4.549 4.916 5.112 5.609
Pr(BadNews) 6492 0.222 0.416 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
#BadNews 6492 0.247 0.489 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.000
%BadNews 6492 0.214 0.405 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Quarterly Management Forecasts
Occurrence 6840 0.720 0.449 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Frequency 6840 1.680 1.298 0.000 0.000 2.000 3.000 5.000
Precision 4922 1.837 0.776 0.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 3.000
Accuracy 4267 -7.259 14.040 -105.800 -7.264 -2.863 -1.070 -0.018
Optimism 4267 -0.053 0.846 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Ln(Horizon) 4906 3.984 0.649 1.792 3.738 4.190 4.511 4.736
All Management Forecasts
Occurrence 6840 0.787 0.410 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Frequency 6840 2.533 1.800 0.000 1.000 3.000 4.000 7.000
Precision 5380 1.817 0.771 0.000 1.750 2.000 2.000 3.000
Accuracy 4829 -13.340 27.530 -192.900 -12.270 -4.818 -1.846 -0.048
Optimism 4829 -0.026 0.787 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Ln(Horizon) 5365 4.279 0.603 2.197 4.069 4.477 4.694 5.201
Board Secretary Characteristics
Law 6840 0.020 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Accounting 6840 0.163 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
ForeignExp 6840 0.035 0.169 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
PartyMeb 6840 0.323 0.468 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Board_Duality 6840 0.269 0.443 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
CFO_Duality 6840 0.082 0.274 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Mag_Duality 6840 0.408 0.492 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
EquityHold 6834 2.086 3.942 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.800
Female 6840 0.177 0.382 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 6840 40.550 7.010 23.000 35.000 40.000 45.000 71.000
Ln(Tenure) 6840 6.939 1.059 3.091 6.433 7.170 7.687 8.490
Ln(Pay) 4439 12.090 0.846 9.879 11.520 12.120 12.660 14.130
Turnover 5398 0.142 0.349 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Firm Characteristics
BIndep 6840 0.335 0.091 0.000 0.333 0.333 0.375 0.556
InstHold 6840 0.170 0.189 0.000 0.021 0.096 0.265 0.742
GovHold 6840 0.188 0.239 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.383 0.750
CR 6840 0.584 0.150 0.229 0.477 0.603 0.704 0.868
Duality 6840 0.203 0.402 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
BMeet 6840 8.525 3.249 3.000 6.000 8.000 10.000 20.000
P/B 6840 4.060 3.769 -5.750 1.970 3.125 5.000 24.340
Ln(Assets) 6840 21.280 1.061 18.820 20.570 21.170 21.890 24.540
MBE 3328 0.401 0.490 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
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We consider several corporate governance factors. BIndep
is the proportion of independent directors on the board.
BMeet is the number of board meetings. Duality is a binary
variable which equals one if a CEO also serves as the chair
of the board, and zero otherwise. InstHold is the proportion
of shares held by institutional investors. GovHold is the
proportion of shares held by the Chinese government. In
addition, the model controls for a number of firm-level
characteristics.7 Since Ajinkya et al. (2005) find a negative
relation between ownership concentration and management
forecast properties, we control for the concentration ratio
(CR), which is measured as the proportion of stocks held by
the firm’s ten largest blockholders. The price-to-book ratio
(P/B) is included to account for a firm’s growth
opportunities; Bamber and Cheon (1998) find that growth
opportunities serving as an indicator of proprietary costs
are related to firms’ forecasting choices. Ln(Assets) is
calculated as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets
and is included in our model because firm size has been
found to affect forecast disclosures (Kasznik and Lev 1995;
Baginski and Hassell 1997). We also control for Crisis,
which is a dummy variable with a value equal to one if the
forecast year is during the crisis period of 2007–2008, and
zero otherwise. Moreover, the literature on voluntary
information disclosure suggests that firms in different
industries are exposed to different litigation costs, propri-
etary costs and information asymmetry and thus manage
their forecasting policies using different strategies (Kasz-
nik and Lev 1995; Bamber and Cheon 1998). Therefore,
we include Industry dummies, defined as the first two digits
of the firm’s Global Industry Classification Standard
(GICS) code.
We estimate Eq. (1) using a Probit model if the
dependent variable is Occurrence, a Poisson model if the
dependent variable is Frequency, and an ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression if the dependent variable is
Precision, Accuracy or Optimism. For the regressions of
Precision, Accuracy and Optimism, we add an additional
control variable, Ln(Horizon), which is the natural loga-
rithm of the number of days between the forecast release
date and the actual earnings announcement date.
Ln(Horizon) is included because the literature has found a
negative relation between forecast horizon and forecast
precision and accuracy (Pownall et al. 1993; Baginski and
Hassell 1997; Xu 2010). If multiple forecasts are issued in
a firm-year, we take the average horizon to generate this
Table 3 continued
Variable #Obs. Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max
CMBE 2512 0.195 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Firm-Level Outcomes
MAO 5773 0.081 0.273 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
SUE 4829 0.060 0.237 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Donation 4084 1.496 4.394 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 19.600
CSR_Disclose 4084 0.219 0.414 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
CapExp 5730 0.390 0.616 -0.939 0.065 0.215 0.509 3.900
Opacity 6172 0.118 0.189 0.001 0.024 0.057 0.122 1.205
ROA 6830 0.036 0.065 -0.168 0.010 0.034 0.067 0.177
ROS 6817 0.050 0.177 -0.675 0.017 0.054 0.117 0.396
Tobin’s Q 6823 2.267 1.457 0.896 1.282 1.767 2.675 7.108
This table presents descriptive statistics for the management earnings forecasts, board secretary characteristics, firm characteristics and firm-level
outcome variables used in our regressions. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1
7 We also control for the meeting or beating earnings expectations
(MBE) and consistency in meeting or beating earnings expectations
(CMBE), because prior studies find that managers issue management
forecasts to meet or beat the market’s expectations (MBE), and this
tendency is stronger when firms have consistently met or beaten the
market’s expectations (Matsumoto 2002; Kross et al. 2011). Follow-
ing Kross et al. (2011), we construct two control variables for firms’
MBE record: (1) MBE is a dummy variable with a value equal to one
if a firm’s actual earnings meet or beat the most recent consensus
analyst forecast, and zero otherwise; and (2) CMBE is a dummy
variable with a value equal to one if a firm’s actual earnings meet or
beat the most recent consensus analyst forecast for the past two
consecutive years, and zero otherwise. Thus, we control the MBE and
CMBE in Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 as further additional tests in our
Unpublished Appendix. The results are broadly consistent. We thank
the referee for this suggestion. It is worth noting that by incorporating
MBE and CMBE in the regression model, we lose 51 and 63% of our
observations, respectively. This is because analyst earnings forecast
data is only available for annual earnings from 2002, and analysts’
earnings forecasts are not prevalent either. Table 2 reports the
observations of MBE and CMBE.
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variable. On the right side of Eq. (1), the independent
variables, except Ln(Horizon), are lagged by 1 year rela-
tive to the dependent variable to mitigate reverse causality.
We winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99%.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on management
earnings forecasts by classifying the management fore-
casts into annual and quarterly forecasts. The difference
in mean and median tests shows that there is no obvious
difference in forecast precision between the two types of
forecasts. The annual forecasts are substantially higher
(lower) than the quarterly forecasts in terms of forecast
optimism and horizon (forecast accuracy), according to
both the difference in mean and the difference in
median.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables
used in our empirical analyses. The mean of Occurrence is
0.654, 0.720 and 0.787 for annual forecasts, quarterly
forecasts and overall forecasts, respectively, suggesting
that 65.4, 72 and 78.7% of firm-year observations have at
least one forecast issuance for annual forecasts, quarterly
forecasts and overall forecasts, respectively. The mean
forecasting frequency is 0.850, 1.680 and 2.533 for annual
forecasts, quarterly forecasts and overall forecasts,
respectively, which indicates the prevalence of multiple
forecast disclosures by Chinese firms. The 25th percentile
of forecasting precision is 2.00, 2.00 and 1.75 for,
respectively, annual forecasts, quarterly forecasts and
overall forecasts, suggesting a high propensity of Chinese
firms to issue quantitative forecasts. The median forecast-
ing accuracy is -4.818 for overall forecasts, while the
mean accuracy for overall forecasts surprisingly reaches
-13.340. These results reveal that there is a high dis-
crepancy in management forecast accuracy and that the
forecasts issued by certain firms or in certain years could be
extremely unreliable. The mean Optimism (-0.026 for
overall forecasts) is a negative value, consistent with the
idea that management forecasts, on average, are pes-
simistically biased in China.
We find that lots of board secretaries have a certificate in
accounting or serve as a Party member in our sample even
though overall it is rare for secretaries to have a law licence
or have either foreign experience. In addition, more than
half of board secretaries hold another senior role in Chinese
listed firms; most hold another non-accounting manage-
ment position. Over 75% of board secretaries do not have
any equity holdings in their firms.
Empirical Results
Board Secretary Characteristics and Management
Forecast Occurrence
We examine the effects of board secretaries’ professional
background, political connections, role duality and equity
holdings on management forecast occurrence by using
annual forecasts, quarterly forecasts and overall forecasts.
The results are shown in Table 4. Panels A, B and C show
results for testing of H1, H2, H3 and H4 by using annual
forecast occurrence, quarterly forecast occurrence and
overall forecast occurrence, respectively. Models 5, 10 and
15 report the results for testing all hypotheses together
using annual forecasts, quarterly forecasts and overall
forecasts, respectively. The coefficients of Law are signif-
icantly positive in models 6, 10, 11 and 15, indicating that
board secretaries with legal expertise tend to issue quar-
terly earnings forecasts. The coefficients of Accounting are
significantly positive in models 1, 5, 6, 10, 11 and 15,
indicating that board secretaries with accounting expertise
are more likely to issue both annual and quarterly earnings
forecasts. The coefficient of ForeignExp is significantly
positive in models 6 and 10, indicating that board secre-
taries with international experience are more likely to issue
quarterly annual forecasts. The results generally support
the prediction that board secretaries with more expertise
are more likely to issue management forecasts, supporting
our H1a, 1b and 1c. The coefficient on PartyMeb is sig-
nificantly negative in models 2, 5, 7 and 10 at the 5% level,
which provides evidence of the adverse effect of political
connections on both annual and quarterly earnings forecast
issuance and supports our H2. In models 3, 5, 8, 10, 13 and
15, we show that the coefficients on Board_Duality,
CFO_Duality and Mag_Duality are positively significant.
The results suggest that board secretaries sitting on the
board are more likely to issue annual earnings forecasts and
that board secretaries with a dual CFO or other senior
manager title are more likely to issue both annual and
quarterly earnings forecasts. Overall, board secretaries with
a second senior position generally have more power and
more inside information to issue earnings forecasts; this
supports our H3a, 3b and 3c. Finally, the coefficient on
EquityHold is significantly positive in models 4, 5, 9, 10,
14 and 15, at the 1% level, which indicates that board
secretaries with stockholdings in their firms are more likely
to voluntarily disclose both annual and quarterly earnings
forecasts for the sake of outside investors. The evidence
supports our H4.
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Board Secretary Characteristics and Management
Forecast Frequency
Table 5 reports the test results for the effects of board sec-
retaries’ professional background, political connections,
dual roles and equity holdings on management forecast fre-
quency. Panels A, B and C show results for testing of H1, H2,
H3 and H4 by using annual forecast frequency, quarterly
forecast frequency and overall forecast frequency, respec-
tively. It shows that Law, Accounting and ForeignExp are
significantly and positively associated with forecast fre-
quency in models 1, 5, 6, 10, 11 and 15, which indicates that
the professional expertise of board secretaries improves
earnings forecast frequency, supporting H1a, 1b and 1c. The
coefficient of PartyMeb is significantly negative in all
models. The results suggest that political connections
decrease board secretaries’ willingness to make frequent
annual and quarterly forecast disclosures and support H2.
Furthermore, the coefficient estimates on Board_Duality,
CFO_Duality and Mag_Duality are significantly positively
related to forecast frequency in all models, indicating that
board secretary role duality leads to more frequent annual
and quarterly forecast issuance. This evidence supports H3a,
3b and 3c. The coefficient estimates on EquityHold are sig-
nificantly positive in all models, which support H4, about the
positive incentive role of board secretaries’ stockholdings
for both annual and quarterly forecast frequency.
Board Secretary Characteristics and Management
Forecast Precision
Table 6 provides the test results for the effects of board
secretaries’ professional background, political connections,
role duality and equity holdings on management forecast
precision. Panels A, B and C show results for testing of H1,
H2, H3 and H4 by using annual forecast precision, quar-
terly forecast precision and overall forecasts precision,
respectively. The coefficient estimates on Board_Duality,
CFO_Duality and Mag_Duality are significantly positive
on both annual and quarterly forecast precision in all
models. This result suggests that board secretaries with role
duality employ their expanded power and superior
resources to generate more precise earnings forecasts,
which supports H3a, 3b and 3c. In addition, the result
shows that EquityHold significantly improves the precision
of quarterly earnings forecasts and supports H4.
Board Secretary Characteristics and Management
Forecast Accuracy
As for the accuracy of management forecasts, we examine
its association with board secretary characteristics from
two ways: the value (Accuracy) and the sign (Optimism). In
Table 7, we present the results for the associations between
board secretary characteristics and forecast Accuracy.
Panels A, B and C show results for testing of H1, H2, H3
and H4 by using annual forecast accuracy, quarterly fore-
cast accuracy and overall forecast accuracy, respectively.
The coefficient estimate on Accounting is significantly
positive in model 11. For the effect of duality on forecast
accuracy, we find that the coefficients on CFO_Duality and
Mag_Duality are significantly positive in models 3, 5, 13
and 15, which supports our H3b and 3c, that also holding
an additional senior role in a firm contributes to board
secretaries’ concentrated power and information advan-
tage, with which they can produce more accurate estimates
about future earnings. Furthermore, we report a signifi-
cantly negative relation between Equityhold and Accuracy
in all models, supporting H4.
We also examine whether and how board secretary
characteristics affect the way inwhichmanagement earnings
forecasts are directionally biased, andwe report our results in
Table 8. Panels A, B and C show results for testing of H1,
H2, H3 and H4 by using annual forecast optimism, quarterly
forecast optimism and overall forecast optimism, respec-
tively. The coefficient estimates on Board_Duality and
Mag_Duality are significantly positive in models 9, 13 and
15. The results reveal that board secretaries who also serve as
board members or non-accounting senior executives gener-
ally issue more optimistically biased quarterly earnings
forecasts, which literally means that their forecasts tend to
exceed actual earnings. The result suggests that board sec-
retaries with higher hierarchical status within firms, as evi-
denced by their dual senior positions, overestimate firm
profitability and issue more optimistic future earnings esti-
mates. In addition, we document a significantly positive
coefficient on EquityHold in all models, suggesting that
board secretaries with stockholdings tend to issue opti-
mistically biased forecasts. This could result from the self-
serving tendency of board secretaries.8
Regulatory Change
Although the duties of board secretaries have been speci-
fied in the Guidance for the Articles of Listed Company
since 1997,9 they were not covered in Company Law until
8 We explore the issue by examining the association between the
change in equity holdings of board secretaries and management
forecast optimism. We identify 105 (556) firm-years with changes in
the equity holdings of board secretaries. The untabulated result shows
that forecasts issued one year before board secretaries’ stockholdings
decrease (increase) are more (less) optimistically biased. This is in the
line with our interpretation of the self-serving benefits.
9 The the Guidance for the Articles of Listed Company was issued by
China Securities Regulatory Commission in 1997. See: http://www.
csrc.gov.cn/pub/shenzhen/xxfw/tzzsyd/ssgs/sszl/ssgsfz/200902/t2009
0226_95511.htm.
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2005. In 2005, the revised Company Law regulated that a
listed company must appoint a board secretary after 1
January 2006. We therefore examine whether the legisla-
tive change strengthens the impact of board secretary
characteristics on management earnings forecasts. We
construct Post, a dummy variable equal to one if the year is
2006 or onward, and zero otherwise and interact each
board secretary characteristics variable with Post. We
regress forecast occurrence, forecast frequency, forecast
precision, forecast accuracy, optimism and bad news
forecast, respectively, on these variables and present the
results in the unpublished appendix. The untabulated
results indicate that the promulgation of the revised com-
pany law of 2005 has little effect on the impact of board
secretaries on management earnings forecasts, presumably
because the duties of board secretaries had been already
clearly defined by China Securities Regulatory Commis-
sion (CSRC) in Guidance for the Articles of Listed Com-
pany promulgated in 1997.
Additional Analyses
Board Secretary Characteristics and Bad News
Versus Good News Management Forecasts
Managers issue more bad news forecasts and downward
guidance than other forecasts because this could help
decrease their legal costs and reputational costs (Skinner
1994; Heflin et al. 2016). Since board secretaries by law
have important legal and regulatory duties, they could face
more litigation risks arising from irresponsible forecast
disclosure. Thus, the characteristics of board secretaries
should have an impact on bad news issuance.10
Following Heflin et al. (2016), we classify a manage-
ment forecast as a bad (good) news forecast if it is lower
(higher) than the most recent consensus analyst forecast,
where the consensus forecast is identified as the median
analyst forecast issued within 180 days prior to the man-
agement forecast disclosure date. Analyst forecast data are
obtained from the CSMAR database. However, only
annual analyst earnings forecast data are available in the
database. Therefore, our analyses on bad news versus good
news management forecasts rely on annual analyst earn-
ings forecasts only. We study three different properties of
bad news management forecasts, following Heflin et al.
(2016): (1) Pr(Bad news) is a dummy variable which is
equal to one if the firm issues at least one bad news
management earnings forecast in a given year, and zero
otherwise; (2) #Bad news is the number of bad news
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10 We thank the referee for suggesting this test to enrich the findings
of our paper.
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management forecasts issued by a firm in a given year; and
(3) %Bad news is the fraction of management earnings
forecasts issued by a firm in a given year that convey bad
news. In line with Kross et al. (2011) and Heflin et al.
(2016), our sample for bad news versus good news man-
agement forecast analysis includes firm-years both with
and without management forecast issued.11
Table 9 presents the regression analysis results for the
impact of board secretary characteristics on bad news and
downward guidance. Panels A, B and C report Probit
regression results on the occurrence of bad news manage-
ment forecasts, Poisson regression results on the frequency
of bad news management forecasts, and OLS regression
results on the fraction of bad news management forecasts,
respectively. The coefficient of Accounting is significantly
positive in models 1 and 11, which suggests that board
secretaries with accounting expertise are more likely to
issue bad news and downward guidance and issue a higher
fraction of bad news forecasts. The coefficient estimate on
PartyMeb is negatively significant in all models. The
results suggest that political connections decrease board
secretaries’ willingness to issue bad news and downward
guidance forecast in terms of occurrence, frequency and
fraction. The coefficients of Board_Duality, CFO_Duality,
Mag_Duality and EquityHold are significantly positive,
offering further evidence that board secretaries with dual
roles and equity holdings are associated with more frequent
issuance of bad news and downward guidance management
forecasts. Overall, board secretaries with professional
expertise, dual roles and equity holdings are more likely to
issue bad news and downward guidance. Their willingness
to issue bad news and downward guidance decreases when
they have political connections.
Management Earnings Forecasts and Board
Secretary Pay
The literature reveals that management earnings forecasts
are used by investors to evaluate managers’ abilities to
adapt future production plans in response to foreseeable
changes in the business environment (Trueman 1986; Baik
et al. 2011; Yang 2012). Lee et al. (2012) further show that
management earnings forecast errors increase the likeli-
hood of poorly performing CEOs being replaced. These
studies generally suggest that management earnings fore-
casts provide an important signal of managerial ability.
Thus, in this paper we argue that firms use management
earnings forecasts to evaluate board secretaries’ perfor-
mance, because they have a duty to reduce information
asymmetry between corporate insiders and outside
investors by ensuring full and accurate forecast disclosure.
Since investors may favourably evaluate firms with fre-
quent forecast issuance and high forecast precision and
accuracy, these firms that benefit from improved forecast
disclosure are likely to reward their board secretaries with
higher compensation. Therefore, we predict that board
secretaries’ pay is positively related to the occurrence,
frequency, precision and accuracy of management fore-
casts. To verify our prediction, we estimate regressions
where the dependent variable is Ln(Pay), calculated as the
natural logarithm of the sum of a board secretary’s salary
and bonus. The independent variables are lagged by 1 year
relative to the dependent variable.
Table 10 presents the regression results for management
earnings forecasts and board secretary pay.12 Panel A
reports the results by using the OLS estimator. In models
1–6, we regress board secretary Pay on each of the forecast
property variables, respectively, and then in model 7 we
include all properties of management forecasts if there is at
least one forecast issuance, i.e., the value of Occurrence is
one. We report in model 1 that the coefficient on Occur-
rence is significantly positive at the 1% level, implying
board secretaries that issue forecasts receive higher com-
pensation than secretaries without forecast issuance. In
models 2–6, which consider the situation where at least one
forecast is disclosed by board secretaries in a given year,
we find the coefficients on Frequency, Precision, Accuracy
and %BadNews consistently significantly positive, consis-
tent with the argument that pay is significantly higher for
board secretaries that issue high-quality forecasts. The
coefficient of Optimism is significantly negative, which
suggests that board secretaries who issue less optimistically
biased forecasts receive higher pay. The results also reveal
the link between board secretary characteristics and pay.
For example, board secretaries with foreign experience,
dual roles and stock holdings receive more compensation,
on average, while pay is significantly lower for secretaries
with Party membership.
One concern is the potential reverse causality and
omitted variables issue for the impact of management
forecasts on board secretary pay. One can definitely expect
that higher compensation and job retention have an impact
on accuracy.13 First, we address this concern by consider-
ing the lagged independent variables in Panel A of
Table 10. Second, we further address the potential reverse
causality and omitted variables issues by using a dynamic
11 When there is no management forecast issuance in a given firm-
year, Pr(Bad news), #Bad news and %Bad news are set as zero.
12 Board secretaries’ pay and replacement decisions should be made
based on the overall board secretaries’ forecast quality. Thus, we use
overall management forecast sample, without dividing it into the
annual and quarterly forecasts. The impact of quarterly and annual
management forecasts on board secretary pay is provided in our
unpublished appendix.
13 We thank the referee for pointing this out.
Do Board Secretaries Influence Management Earnings Forecasts?
123
T
a
b
le
1
0
M
an
ag
em
en
t
ea
rn
in
g
s
fo
re
ca
st
s
an
d
b
o
ar
d
se
cr
et
ar
y
p
ay
D
V
=
L
n
(P
ay
)
P
an
el
A
:
O
L
S
P
an
el
B
:
d
y
n
am
ic
O
L
S
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
O
cc
u
rr
en
ce
0
.0
7
9
2
*
*
*
(3
.0
4
)
0
.0
1
7
5
(0
.9
6
)
F
re
q
u
en
cy
0
.0
1
8
0
*
*
*
(2
.8
2
)
0
.0
1
5
6
(1
.4
9
)
0
.0
0
1
5
(0
.3
3
)
P
re
ci
si
o
n
0
.1
8
3
0
*
*
*
(1
0
.0
9
)
0
.1
6
9
1
*
*
*
(7
.0
6
)
0
.0
3
6
4
*
*
*
(2
.6
0
)
A
cc
u
ra
cy
0
.0
0
2
3
*
*
*
(4
.7
7
)
0
.0
0
1
7
*
*
*
(3
.5
8
)
0
.0
0
0
8
*
*
(2
.0
3
)
O
p
ti
m
is
m
-
0
.0
7
4
4
*
*
*
(-
4
.2
4
)
-
0
.0
6
3
2
*
*
*
(-
3
.6
4
)
%
B
ad
N
ew
s
0
.1
6
2
3
*
*
*
(6
.1
6
)
0
.1
2
9
7
*
*
*
(4
.3
6
)
L
aw
0
.0
0
2
5
(0
.0
4
)
0
.0
0
0
0
(0
.0
0
)
0
.0
3
3
6
(0
.4
2
)
-
0
.0
1
6
9
(-
0
.2
0
)
-
0
.0
2
1
5
(-
0
.2
6
)
0
.0
1
0
3
(0
.1
6
)
-
0
.0
3
4
6
(-
0
.4
0
)
0
.0
0
8
6
(0
.1
3
)
0
.0
0
8
5
(0
.1
3
)
0
.0
2
1
8
(0
.2
7
)
0
.0
0
6
7
(0
.0
8
)
A
cc
o
u
n
ti
n
g
-
0
.0
3
4
2
(-
1
.1
0
)
-
0
.0
3
3
8
(-
1
.0
9
)
-
0
.0
3
8
8
(-
1
.1
2
)
-
0
.0
4
0
2
(-
1
.0
6
)
-
0
.0
3
8
6
(-
1
.0
1
)
-
0
.0
3
3
1
(-
1
.0
6
)
-
0
.0
4
6
8
(-
1
.2
6
)
0
.0
1
0
2
(0
.4
7
)
0
.0
1
0
7
(0
.4
9
)
0
.0
1
3
4
(0
.5
5
)
0
.0
0
9
2
(0
.3
5
)
F
o
re
ig
n
E
x
p
0
.2
2
7
6
*
*
*
(3
.6
0
)
0
.2
2
6
8
*
*
*
(3
.5
9
)
0
.2
5
6
8
*
*
*
(3
.7
7
)
0
.2
4
9
2
*
*
*
(3
.3
6
)
0
.2
5
8
1
*
*
*
(3
.4
8
)
0
.2
2
9
1
*
*
*
(3
.6
4
)
0
.2
6
2
2
*
*
*
(3
.5
9
)
0
.0
3
6
2
(0
.8
0
)
0
.0
3
6
1
(0
.8
0
)
0
.0
3
6
7
(0
.7
5
)
0
.0
1
7
6
(0
.3
3
)
P
ar
ty
M
eb
-
0
.1
2
3
6
*
*
*
(-
4
.9
2
)
-
0
.1
2
3
1
*
*
*
(-
4
.9
0
)
-
0
.1
4
5
5
*
*
*
(-
5
.0
9
)
-
0
.1
4
6
1
*
*
*
(-
4
.6
9
)
-
0
.1
4
8
6
*
*
*
(-
4
.7
6
)
-
0
.1
2
1
5
*
*
*
(-
4
.8
5
)
-
0
.1
4
9
5
*
*
*
(-
4
.8
9
)
-
0
.0
3
1
1
*
(-
1
.7
9
)
-
0
.0
3
1
1
*
(-
1
.7
9
)
-
0
.0
3
9
7
*
*
(-
1
.9
6
)
-
0
.0
3
9
2
*
(-
1
.8
2
)
B
o
ar
d
_
D
u
al
it
y
0
.0
0
3
7
(0
.1
4
)
0
.0
0
1
8
(0
.0
7
)
0
.0
0
9
8
(0
.3
5
)
0
.0
3
4
8
(1
.1
3
)
0
.0
3
8
2
(1
.2
4
)
-
0
.0
0
0
6
(-
0
.0
2
)
0
.0
3
1
4
(1
.0
4
)
-
0
.0
1
2
9
(-
0
.7
5
)
-
0
.0
1
3
1
(-
0
.7
6
)
-
0
.0
0
7
6
(-
0
.3
9
)
-
0
.0
0
5
3
(-
0
.2
6
)
C
F
O
_
D
u
al
it
y
0
.1
7
8
4
*
*
*
(4
.4
1
)
0
.1
7
7
5
*
*
*
(4
.3
9
)
0
.1
8
2
8
*
*
*
(4
.2
0
)
0
.2
0
0
2
*
*
*
(4
.2
2
)
0
.2
1
2
2
*
*
*
(4
.4
7
)
0
.1
7
7
8
*
*
*
(4
.3
8
)
0
.2
0
5
3
*
*
*
(4
.3
7
)
-
0
.0
2
1
5
(-
0
.8
0
)
-
0
.0
2
1
4
(-
0
.8
0
)
-
0
.0
1
7
7
(-
0
.5
9
)
-
0
.0
0
6
0
(-
0
.1
8
)
M
ag
_
D
u
al
it
y
0
.2
6
5
2
*
*
*
(1
1
.8
0
)
0
.2
6
1
9
*
*
*
(1
1
.5
7
)
0
.2
4
9
8
*
*
*
(9
.9
3
)
0
.2
7
1
8
*
*
*
(9
.8
7
)
0
.2
7
5
7
*
*
*
(9
.9
7
)
0
.2
6
1
3
*
*
*
(1
1
.6
7
)
0
.2
5
9
5
*
*
*
(9
.4
8
)
0
.0
3
5
1
*
*
(2
.2
3
)
0
.0
3
5
2
*
*
(2
.2
2
)
0
.0
2
9
7
*
(1
.6
7
)
0
.0
4
9
6
*
*
*
(2
.6
0
)
S
tk
In
ce
n
ti
v
e
0
.0
1
6
3
*
*
*
(5
.9
6
)
0
.0
1
6
4
*
*
*
(6
.0
1
)
0
.0
1
8
8
*
*
*
(6
.1
7
)
0
.0
1
6
7
*
*
*
(4
.8
1
)
0
.0
1
7
9
*
*
*
(5
.1
6
)
0
.0
1
5
7
*
*
*
(5
.7
5
)
0
.0
1
7
1
*
*
*
(4
.9
9
)
0
.0
0
4
0
*
*
(2
.2
0
)
0
.0
0
4
0
*
*
(2
.2
0
)
0
.0
0
4
4
*
*
(2
.1
2
)
0
.0
0
3
2
(1
.4
2
)
F
em
al
e
0
.1
2
2
0
*
*
*
(4
.3
7
)
0
.1
2
0
0
*
*
*
(4
.2
9
)
0
.1
2
7
3
*
*
*
(4
.1
8
)
0
.1
6
8
2
*
*
*
(5
.1
0
)
0
.1
5
9
3
*
*
*
(4
.8
0
)
0
.1
1
9
2
*
*
*
(4
.2
9
)
0
.1
5
6
4
*
*
*
(4
.7
9
)
0
.0
3
4
9
*
(1
.8
4
)
0
.0
3
4
7
*
(1
.8
3
)
0
.0
2
8
4
(1
.3
7
)
0
.0
2
4
7
(1
.1
4
)
A
g
e
0
.0
0
3
1
*
(1
.7
5
)
0
.0
0
3
2
*
(1
.8
1
)
0
.0
0
2
9
(1
.4
1
)
0
.0
0
4
7
*
*
(2
.0
9
)
0
.0
0
4
6
*
*
(2
.0
2
)
0
.0
0
3
2
*
(1
.8
0
)
0
.0
0
3
0
(1
.3
5
)
-
0
.0
0
2
7
*
*
(-
2
.0
5
)
-
0
.0
0
2
7
*
*
(-
2
.0
3
)
-
0
.0
0
1
9
(-
1
.2
2
)
-
0
.0
0
0
9
(-
0
.5
4
)
L
n
(T
en
u
re
)
0
.0
4
6
5
*
*
*
(4
.4
0
)
0
.0
4
7
1
*
*
*
(4
.4
5
)
0
.0
5
3
4
*
*
*
(4
.5
6
)
0
.0
5
6
5
*
*
*
(4
.3
0
)
0
.0
5
7
3
*
*
*
(4
.3
9
)
0
.0
4
6
7
*
*
*
(4
.4
5
)
0
.0
5
9
5
*
*
*
(4
.5
3
)
-
0
.0
5
4
5
*
*
*
(-
6
.0
4
)
-
0
.0
5
4
6
*
*
*
(-
6
.0
3
)
-
0
.0
5
6
5
*
*
*
(-
5
.4
2
)
-
0
.0
5
8
0
*
*
*
(-
5
.2
5
)
B
In
d
ep
0
.6
4
5
5
*
*
*
(3
.0
8
)
0
.6
6
4
8
*
*
*
(3
.1
6
)
0
.2
1
7
3
(0
.8
9
)
0
.2
6
9
7
(0
.9
8
)
0
.3
4
0
9
(1
.2
4
)
0
.6
4
4
4
*
*
*
(3
.0
8
)
0
.1
6
2
7
(0
.6
0
)
-
0
.1
2
7
8
(-
0
.9
0
)
-
0
.1
2
1
1
(-
0
.8
5
)
-
0
.1
9
9
8
(-
1
.2
5
)
-
0
.1
5
1
3
(-
0
.9
0
)
L. Xing et al.
123
T
a
b
le
1
0
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
D
V
=
L
n
(P
ay
)
P
an
el
A
:
O
L
S
P
an
el
B
:
d
y
n
am
ic
O
L
S
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
In
st
H
o
ld
0
.2
4
5
2
*
*
*
(4
.1
1
)
0
.2
4
2
0
*
*
*
(4
.0
5
)
0
.2
4
4
1
*
*
*
(3
.7
1
)
0
.2
2
8
4
*
*
*
(3
.1
4
)
0
.2
2
1
8
*
*
*
(3
.0
4
)
0
.2
4
3
9
*
*
*
(4
.1
0
)
0
.2
2
3
9
*
*
*
(3
.1
0
)
0
.0
9
8
3
*
*
(2
.3
0
)
0
.0
9
9
1
*
*
(2
.3
2
)
0
.0
6
9
4
(1
.4
5
)
0
.0
5
3
0
(1
.0
4
)
G
o
v
H
o
ld
-
0
.3
9
7
8
*
*
*
(-
7
.4
6
)
-
0
.3
9
9
9
*
*
*
(-
7
.5
1
)
-
0
.3
1
0
7
*
*
*
(-
5
.0
0
)
-
0
.3
3
1
3
*
*
*
(-
4
.8
3
)
-
0
.3
6
8
5
*
*
*
(-
5
.4
2
)
-
0
.3
7
8
1
*
*
*
(-
7
.1
1
)
-
0
.2
4
0
4
*
*
*
(-
3
.5
7
)
-
0
.0
3
6
4
(-
0
.9
6
)
-
0
.0
3
9
1
(-
1
.0
3
)
-
0
.0
4
4
0
(-
0
.9
8
)
-
0
.0
4
0
3
(-
0
.8
6
)
C
R
0
.4
2
5
3
*
*
*
(6
.0
4
)
0
.4
2
8
1
*
*
*
(6
.0
8
)
0
.4
6
2
6
*
*
*
(5
.8
2
)
0
.3
5
7
1
*
*
*
(4
.0
6
)
0
.3
3
2
2
*
*
*
(3
.8
0
)
0
.3
8
2
5
*
*
*
(5
.4
2
)
0
.3
2
9
0
*
*
*
(3
.7
2
)
0
.0
3
5
2
(0
.7
7
)
0
.0
3
6
6
(0
.8
0
)
0
.0
5
5
3
(1
.0
4
)
0
.0
1
3
2
(0
.2
3
)
D
u
al
it
y
0
.0
1
9
3
(0
.7
0
)
0
.0
1
7
5
(0
.6
3
)
0
.0
0
3
1
(0
.1
0
)
-
0
.0
1
9
5
( -
0
.5
5
)
-
0
.0
1
8
2
(-
0
.5
1
)
0
.0
1
6
0
(0
.5
8
)
-
0
.0
2
1
4
(-
0
.6
1
)
0
.0
1
7
4
(0
.9
4
)
0
.0
1
7
1
(0
.9
2
)
0
.0
1
2
2
(0
.5
7
)
-
0
.0
1
0
0
(-
0
.4
4
)
B
M
ee
t
0
.0
1
9
4
*
*
*
(5
.5
9
)
0
.0
1
9
1
*
*
*
(5
.4
8
)
0
.0
1
9
4
*
*
*
(4
.8
3
)
0
.0
2
0
7
*
*
*
(4
.6
0
)
0
.0
2
0
2
*
*
*
(4
.4
8
)
0
.0
1
9
1
*
*
*
(5
.5
7
)
0
.0
1
9
3
*
*
*
(4
.4
1
)
0
.0
0
5
5
*
*
(2
.2
8
)
0
.0
0
5
5
*
*
(2
.3
1
)
0
.0
0
6
6
*
*
(2
.3
8
)
0
.0
0
8
0
*
*
*
(2
.7
2
)
P
/B
0
.0
1
8
9
*
*
*
(6
.1
5
)
0
.0
1
9
0
*
*
*
(6
.1
8
)
0
.0
1
0
5
*
*
*
(3
.2
7
)
0
.0
1
1
2
*
*
*
(3
.3
1
)
0
.0
1
2
2
*
*
*
(3
.6
2
)
0
.0
1
8
6
*
*
*
(6
.0
6
)
0
.0
0
6
9
*
*
(2
.0
5
)
0
.0
0
5
0
*
*
(2
.5
6
)
0
.0
0
5
1
*
*
*
(2
.6
1
)
0
.0
0
4
0
*
(1
.8
8
)
0
.0
0
4
0
*
(1
.8
3
)
L
n
(A
ss
et
s)
0
.3
1
4
9
*
*
*
(3
0
.3
5
)
0
.3
1
5
3
*
*
*
(3
0
.3
6
)
0
.2
9
2
3
*
*
*
(2
4
.8
8
)
0
.2
9
4
1
*
*
*
(2
2
.8
9
)
0
.2
8
6
9
*
*
*
(2
2
.1
3
)
0
.3
0
5
3
*
*
*
(2
9
.4
3
)
0
.2
7
7
1
*
*
*
(2
1
.3
4
)
0
.0
6
5
6
*
*
*
(7
.3
5
)
0
.0
6
5
0
*
*
*
(7
.2
8
)
0
.0
6
4
6
*
*
*
(6
.3
5
)
0
.0
6
2
6
*
*
*
(5
.8
7
)
C
ri
si
s
-
0
.0
0
9
5
(-
0
.4
0
)
-
0
.0
0
8
2
(-
0
.3
4
)
-
0
.0
4
1
8
(-
1
.5
3
)
-
0
.0
6
2
5
*
*
(-
2
.1
1
)
-
0
.0
5
9
3
*
*
(-
2
.0
0
)
-
0
.0
0
2
2
(-
0
.0
9
)
-
0
.0
5
3
7
*
(-
1
.8
2
)
-
0
.0
6
3
3
*
*
*
(-
3
.8
6
)
-
0
.0
6
2
9
*
*
*
(-
3
.8
4
)
-
0
.0
6
2
6
*
*
*
(-
3
.3
1
)
-
0
.0
7
4
2
*
*
*
(-
3
.6
8
)
L
n
(P
ay
)_
L
ag
1
0
.7
8
5
8
*
*
*
(5
7
.0
6
)
0
.7
8
6
1
*
*
*
(5
7
.1
4
)
0
.7
7
4
9
*
*
*
(4
8
.1
4
)
0
.7
8
1
8
*
*
*
(4
5
.9
7
)
In
te
rc
ep
t
4
.3
2
2
6
*
*
*
(1
6
.3
2
)
4
.3
1
7
1
*
*
*
(1
6
.2
0
)
4
.3
8
6
9
*
*
*
(1
4
.7
7
)
5
.0
8
1
3
*
*
*
(1
5
.7
4
)
5
.1
3
5
8
*
*
*
(1
6
.1
6
)
4
.5
9
4
0
*
*
*
(1
7
.5
1
)
5
.0
8
0
9
*
*
*
(1
5
.2
3
)
1
.6
9
1
4
*
*
*
(7
.2
9
)
1
.7
0
6
2
*
*
*
(7
.3
0
)
1
.9
3
9
5
*
*
*
(8
.3
2
)
1
.9
2
2
2
*
*
*
(7
.7
5
)
ad
j.
R
-s
q
0
.3
0
0
0
.3
0
0
0
.3
2
8
0
.3
0
5
0
.3
0
4
0
.3
0
4
0
.3
2
8
0
.7
0
2
0
.7
0
2
0
.6
9
4
0
.7
0
2
N
4
4
0
5
4
4
0
5
3
3
4
1
2
8
2
3
2
8
2
3
4
4
0
5
2
8
2
3
3
8
6
5
3
8
6
5
2
9
9
6
2
5
9
5
D
V
=
L
n
(P
ay
)
P
an
el
B
:
d
y
n
am
ic
O
L
S
P
an
el
C
:
d
y
n
am
ic
p
an
el
G
M
M
(1
2
)
(1
3
)
(1
4
)
(1
5
)
(1
6
)
(1
7
)
(1
8
)
(1
9
)
(2
0
)
(2
1
)
O
cc
u
rr
en
ce
0
.2
3
9
2
*
*
(2
.4
6
)
F
re
q
u
en
cy
-
0
.0
0
1
0
(-
0
.1
5
)
0
.0
2
0
6
(1
.1
3
)
0
.0
1
9
2
(1
.3
8
)
P
re
ci
si
o
n
0
.0
3
1
2
*
(1
.9
3
)
0
.1
2
9
3
*
*
(2
.5
1
)
0
.0
9
1
1
*
*
*
(2
.8
2
)
A
cc
u
ra
cy
0
.0
0
0
6
*
(1
.6
6
)
0
.0
0
1
7
*
*
(2
.4
2
)
0
.0
0
1
4
*
*
(2
.1
1
)
O
p
ti
m
is
m
-
0
.0
3
4
1
*
*
*
(-
2
.9
2
)
-
0
.0
3
0
3
*
*
*
(-
2
.6
2
)
-
0
.0
7
3
9
*
*
(-
2
.5
1
)
-
0
.0
6
0
1
*
*
(-
2
.2
0
)
%
B
ad
N
ew
s
0
.0
1
2
7
(0
.6
9
)
0
.0
1
5
7
(0
.8
2
)
0
.0
1
8
0
(0
.4
6
)
0
.0
1
4
1
(0
.3
4
)
L
aw
0
.0
0
5
4
(0
.0
6
)
0
.0
0
9
5
(0
.1
4
)
0
.0
0
5
5
(0
.0
8
)
-
0
.1
1
5
9
(-
0
.5
5
)
-
0
.1
7
5
2
(-
0
.8
3
)
-
0
.1
1
1
9
(-
0
.3
5
)
0
.1
0
0
8
(0
.4
8
)
0
.1
1
9
9
(0
.5
9
)
-
0
.0
7
3
1
(-
0
.5
3
)
0
.1
5
7
9
(0
.8
4
)
Do Board Secretaries Influence Management Earnings Forecasts?
123
T
a
b
le
1
0
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
D
V
=
L
n
(P
ay
)
P
an
el
B
:
d
y
n
am
ic
O
L
S
P
an
el
C
:
d
y
n
am
ic
p
an
el
G
M
M
(1
2
)
(1
3
)
(1
4
)
(1
5
)
(1
6
)
(1
7
)
(1
8
)
(1
9
)
(2
0
)
(2
1
)
A
cc
o
u
n
ti
n
g
0
.0
1
0
4
(0
.4
0
)
0
.0
1
0
8
(0
.4
9
)
0
.0
0
8
7
(0
.3
4
)
-
0
.0
9
1
6
(-
0
.9
7
)
-
0
.0
3
8
9
(-
0
.4
2
)
-
0
.0
6
5
5
(-
0
.5
9
)
-
0
.1
1
3
1
(-
1
.3
5
)
-
0
.0
9
7
3
(-
1
.2
1
)
0
.0
6
1
8
(0
.8
6
)
-
0
.1
1
4
1
(-
1
.5
3
)
F
o
re
ig
n
E
x
p
0
.0
2
3
5
(0
.4
5
)
0
.0
3
6
3
(0
.8
0
)
0
.0
2
4
0
(0
.4
9
)
0
.0
2
6
5
(0
.1
3
)
0
.1
0
9
1
(0
.5
6
)
0
.0
2
8
8
(0
.1
4
)
0
.1
3
7
9
(1
.0
2
)
0
.0
9
5
8
(0
.7
8
)
0
.0
8
9
8
(0
.7
1
)
0
.0
7
7
9
(0
.7
0
)
P
ar
ty
M
eb
-
0
.0
4
0
0
*
(-
1
.8
5
)
-
0
.0
3
1
0
*
(-
1
.7
8
)
-
0
.0
4
0
9
*
*
(-
2
.0
3
)
-
0
.1
6
4
4
*
(-
1
.7
5
)
-
0
.1
6
7
9
*
(-
1
.8
4
)
-
0
.2
9
9
3
*
*
(-
2
.5
2
)
-
0
.0
6
0
8
(-
0
.9
5
)
-
0
.0
7
2
1
(-
1
.1
0
)
-
0
.1
0
0
1
*
(-
1
.8
1
)
-
0
.0
4
8
9
(-
0
.7
8
)
B
o
ar
d
_
D
u
al
it
y
-
0
.0
0
2
0
(-
0
.1
0
)
-
0
.0
1
3
3
(-
0
.7
7
)
-
0
.0
0
1
9
(-
0
.1
0
)
0
.0
4
3
8
(0
.5
4
)
0
.0
4
2
5
(0
.5
3
)
0
.0
6
3
2
(0
.7
4
)
0
.0
7
0
4
(1
.2
9
)
0
.0
9
0
3
(1
.5
1
)
0
.0
0
6
6
(0
.1
3
)
0
.1
0
2
8
*
(1
.7
6
)
C
F
O
_
D
u
al
it
y
-
0
.0
0
2
0
(-
0
.0
6
)
-
0
.0
2
1
3
(-
0
.7
9
)
-
0
.0
0
1
4
(-
0
.0
4
)
0
.1
5
9
2
(1
.2
7
)
0
.0
9
9
8
(0
.7
6
)
0
.0
8
7
2
(0
.5
2
)
0
.0
2
7
4
(0
.2
4
)
0
.0
3
1
3
(0
.2
9
)
-
0
.0
3
7
2
(-
0
.4
1
)
0
.0
7
8
2
(0
.7
7
)
M
ag
_
D
u
al
it
y
0
.0
5
1
0
*
*
*
(2
.6
8
)
0
.0
3
5
3
*
*
(2
.2
4
)
0
.0
5
0
9
*
*
*
(2
.6
9
)
0
.1
4
6
2
*
*
(2
.4
4
)
0
.1
4
1
6
*
*
(2
.3
4
)
0
.1
2
7
1
*
(1
.7
5
)
0
.0
7
7
9
(1
.4
0
)
0
.0
6
9
3
(1
.2
6
)
0
.0
6
0
5
(1
.3
9
)
0
.1
0
8
6
*
*
(2
.1
8
)
S
tk
In
ce
n
ti
v
e
0
.0
0
3
6
(1
.5
9
)
0
.0
0
3
9
*
*
(2
.1
8
)
0
.0
0
3
6
(1
.5
8
)
0
.0
1
1
7
(0
.9
9
)
0
.0
1
3
7
(1
.1
6
)
0
.0
1
5
5
(1
.0
9
)
0
.0
0
1
8
(0
.2
6
)
0
.0
0
5
7
(0
.7
6
)
-
0
.0
0
3
0
(-
0
.4
6
)
0
.0
0
7
9
(1
.1
2
)
F
em
al
e
0
.0
2
1
2
(0
.9
7
)
0
.0
3
4
8
*
(1
.8
3
)
0
.0
2
3
2
(1
.0
7
)
0
.0
9
5
1
(0
.8
9
)
0
.0
5
8
6
(0
.5
7
)
0
.0
6
1
9
(0
.4
6
)
0
.0
8
5
3
(1
.3
2
)
0
.0
5
6
1
(0
.8
9
)
0
.1
1
0
8
*
(1
.7
6
)
0
.0
7
9
9
(1
.1
6
)
A
g
e
-
0
.0
0
1
0
(-
0
.6
0
)
-
0
.0
0
2
7
*
*
(-
2
.0
3
)
-
0
.0
0
1
3
(-
0
.8
4
)
-
0
.0
0
5
6
(-
0
.7
8
)
-
0
.0
0
2
9
(-
0
.4
2
)
-
0
.0
0
0
3
(-
0
.0
3
)
0
.0
0
1
1
(0
.1
9
)
0
.0
0
0
3
(0
.0
5
)
0
.0
0
1
4
(0
.2
9
)
-
0
.0
0
2
5
(-
0
.5
0
)
L
n
(T
en
u
re
)
-
0
.0
5
7
5
*
*
*
(-
5
.2
3
)
-
0
.0
5
4
5
*
*
*
( -
6
.0
4
)
-
0
.0
5
7
1
*
*
*
(-
4
.7
8
)
-
0
.0
5
6
2
(-
1
.4
6
)
-
0
.0
7
3
0
*
(-
1
.9
1
)
-
0
.0
4
3
7
(-
0
.9
4
)
-
0
.0
9
9
5
*
*
*
(-
2
.5
8
)
-
0
.1
0
6
7
*
*
*
(-
3
.0
4
)
-
0
.0
7
6
2
*
*
(-
2
.5
2
)
-
0
.1
0
3
5
*
*
*
(-
3
.0
0
)
B
In
d
ep
-
0
.1
1
9
9
(-
0
.7
1
)
-
0
.1
2
1
9
(-
0
.8
6
)
-
0
.1
5
6
7
(-
0
.9
5
)
0
.4
5
4
3
(0
.5
0
)
1
.0
5
2
4
(1
.2
0
)
-
0
.1
4
6
9
(-
0
.1
4
)
0
.5
7
0
0
(1
.2
0
)
0
.5
4
9
5
(1
.1
5
)
1
.0
1
5
6
*
*
*
(2
.8
6
)
0
.4
3
8
0
(0
.9
9
)
In
st
H
o
ld
0
.0
4
9
4
(0
.9
6
)
0
.0
9
9
3
*
*
(2
.3
2
)
0
.0
5
2
4
(1
.1
0
)
0
.0
5
1
7
(0
.2
2
)
0
.0
5
4
1
(0
.2
4
)
0
.1
3
3
7
(0
.5
8
)
0
.0
1
5
9
(0
.1
6
)
0
.0
1
6
2
(0
.1
7
)
0
.0
7
3
1
(0
.6
9
)
-
0
.0
0
6
3
(-
0
.0
6
)
G
o
v
H
o
ld
-
0
.0
5
2
4
(-
1
.1
1
)
-
0
.0
3
7
9
(-
1
.0
0
)
-
0
.0
3
3
2
(-
0
.7
2
)
-
0
.2
8
6
4
*
*
(-
2
.2
8
)
-
0
.3
2
4
0
*
*
*
(-
2
.7
2
)
-
0
.2
1
4
9
(-
1
.4
8
)
-
0
.2
3
5
3
*
*
(-
2
.2
3
)
-
0
.2
4
9
3
*
*
(-
2
.2
8
)
-
0
.1
7
9
3
*
*
(-
2
.3
8
)
-
0
.1
4
2
9
(-
1
.3
7
)
C
R
0
.0
0
8
1
(0
.1
4
)
0
.0
3
3
3
(0
.7
2
)
0
.0
2
0
4
(0
.3
6
)
-
0
.1
8
2
6
(-
0
.9
6
)
-
0
.2
7
3
5
(-
1
.4
7
)
-
0
.0
1
7
7
(-
0
.0
8
)
-
0
.0
1
8
3
(-
0
.1
2
)
-
0
.0
6
4
5
(-
0
.4
5
)
0
.0
3
1
7
(0
.2
6
)
-
0
.0
4
1
3
(-
0
.2
9
)
D
u
al
it
y
-
0
.0
0
9
6
(-
0
.4
3
)
0
.0
1
7
0
(0
.9
1
)
-
0
.0
0
9
2
(-
0
.4
1
)
0
.1
4
9
9
(1
.6
0
)
0
.1
2
9
3
(1
.4
0
)
0
.1
5
7
1
(1
.4
4
)
-
0
.0
1
9
4
(-
0
.3
1
)
-
0
.0
0
7
9
(-
0
.1
3
)
0
.0
6
2
2
(1
.1
1
)
-
0
.0
1
9
4
(-
0
.3
3
)
B
M
ee
t
0
.0
0
7
9
*
*
*
(2
.6
7
)
0
.0
0
5
5
*
*
(2
.3
3
)
0
.0
0
8
0
*
*
*
(2
.7
2
)
0
.0
4
6
1
*
*
*
(2
.7
8
)
0
.0
4
5
4
*
*
*
(2
.7
8
)
0
.0
4
5
0
*
*
*
(2
.7
5
)
0
.0
0
5
4
(0
.7
0
)
0
.0
1
1
1
(1
.3
3
)
0
.0
0
8
1
(1
.1
0
)
0
.0
0
8
4
(1
.0
7
)
P
/B
0
.0
0
4
2
*
(1
.9
0
)
0
.0
0
5
1
*
*
*
(2
.6
2
)
0
.0
0
3
3
(1
.3
6
)
0
.0
1
1
7
*
*
(2
.1
1
)
0
.0
0
9
3
*
(1
.7
0
)
0
.0
1
3
9
*
*
(2
.3
6
)
0
.0
0
5
8
(1
.5
2
)
0
.0
0
3
9
(0
.9
8
)
0
.0
0
6
4
*
(1
.8
4
)
0
.0
0
2
9
(0
.7
5
)
L
n
(A
ss
et
s)
0
.0
5
9
0
*
*
*
(5
.5
0
)
0
.0
6
4
4
*
*
*
(7
.3
3
)
0
.0
5
9
0
*
*
*
(5
.6
4
)
0
.2
1
4
9
*
*
*
(5
.6
5
)
0
.1
9
7
8
*
*
*
(5
.2
9
)
0
.2
0
4
2
*
*
*
(5
.2
4
)
0
.1
3
8
6
*
*
*
(5
.2
8
)
0
.1
2
9
8
*
*
*
(5
.1
7
)
0
.1
1
2
6
*
*
*
(4
.9
5
)
0
.1
3
9
1
*
*
*
(5
.3
3
)
C
ri
si
s
-
0
.0
7
3
4
*
*
*
(-
3
.6
3
)
-
0
.0
6
2
3
*
*
*
(-
3
.8
0
)
-
0
.0
7
0
4
*
*
*
(-
3
.8
0
)
-
0
.1
1
9
1
*
*
*
(-
3
.4
0
)
-
0
.1
0
9
8
*
*
*
(-
3
.2
2
)
-
0
.0
8
9
5
*
*
(-
2
.4
2
)
-
0
.0
5
6
1
*
*
*
(-
2
.6
4
)
-
0
.0
6
5
3
*
*
*
(-
2
.7
6
)
-
0
.0
5
5
5
*
*
*
(-
2
.6
5
)
-
0
.0
5
8
1
*
*
(-
2
.5
6
)
L. Xing et al.
123
model and dynamic panel GMM estimator, following
Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Dezso¨ and Ross (2012).
The results for management earnings forecasts and board
secretary pay using dynamic OLS and dynamic panel
GMM estimator appear in Panels B and C of Table 10,
respectively. The results are consistent with those from
using the OLS estimator, which suggests that our results
are not subject to reverse causality and omitted variable
issues.
Management Earnings Forecasts and Board
Secretary Turnover
Consistent with our previous findings about the effects of
management forecasts on board secretaries’ pay, we expect
that firms also employ management earnings forecasts to
evaluate board secretaries’ performance and abilities when
making replacement decisions. To examine the effects of
management forecasts on board secretary turnover, we
estimate regressions where the dependent variable is
Turnover, with a value set to one if a board secretary is
replaced in a given firm-year, and zero otherwise. The
independent variables are lagged by 1 year relative to the
dependent variable.
In Table 11, we report the regression results for board
secretary turnover. Panels A, B and C report the results by
using a Probit model, dynamic linear probability model and
dynamic panel GMM model, respectively. In Panel A, the
coefficients of Occurrence and Frequency are significantly
positive, indicating that more frequent forecasts increase
the likelihood of board secretaries being replaced. In
addition, the coefficient on Precision and Accuracy is
significantly negative in models 4 and 6, suggesting that
the more precise and accurate forecasts are the less likely it
is that board secretaries will be replaced. Our result also
provides additional support for the findings of Lee et al.
(2012), who suggest that management forecast errors
increase the probability of managerial turnover. Further-
more, the regression results show that board secretaries
with a dual board role have a high tendency to be replaced.
This result suggests that board secretaries with a second
board role tend to keep the senior title and give up the
board secretary role.14 In addition, we use a dynamic linear
probability model and dynamic panel GMM model to
address the potential reverse causality issue and show the
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14 Our sample contains a total of 944 board secretary turnover
observations, among which 322 board secretaries have a second board
of directors role prior to leaving the board secretary position, and 166
(52%) of these former board secretaries continue to hold their board
director position. This result supports our argument that dual-role
directors tend to keep the relatively important position (i.e., the
director position on the board) and abandon the insignificant board
secretary role.
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results in Panels B and C, respectively. The results are
broadly consistent.
As a robustness test, we create a new sample that
includes only the firm-years in which corporate boards are
routinely replaced. Since board secretaries are appointed by
boards of directors and report directly to the boards, they
are likely to be replaced during routine board turnover. We
use the restricted sample to re-estimate the Probit regres-
sions, and the results still hold, with the likelihood of board
secretary turnover being negatively related to management
forecast accuracy, which supports our finding that board
secretaries are less likely to be replaced if they produce
making high-quality forecasts. This result further indicates
that newly appointed directors are more likely to retain
former board secretaries if the secretaries performed well
in previous years.
Board Secretary Characteristics and Firm-level
Outcomes
In addition to enhancing forecast disclosure, board secre-
taries may also impact firm outcomes because they are top
management team members, with a duty to ensure that
corporate decisions comply with laws and regulations.
Therefore, to further explore the role of board secretaries in
firms, we test the impact of board secretary characteristics
on financial report quality, lawsuits, corporate social
responsibility, firm policy, earnings quality and firm per-
formance using the OLS estimation method. To measure
financial report quality, we employ modified auditor
opinion, which is a dummy variable equal to one if a
modified auditor opinion is issued to a firm, and zero
otherwise. Lawsuits is proxied by sue, which is a dummy
variable equal to one if there is a lawsuit against a firm, and
zero otherwise. Corporate social responsibility is measured
by donation and CSR disclosure. Donation is the natural
logarithm of social donations (in Chinese RMB). CSR
disclose is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm dis-
closes its corporate social responsibility in annual reports,
and zero otherwise. For firm policy, we use capital
expenditure, which is the ratio of capital expenditure to
cash flow, where cash flow is calculated as earnings before
extraordinary terms plus depreciation. Earnings quality is
measured by earnings opacity, which is the absolute value
of discretionary accruals calculated based on the Dechow
and Dichev (2002) model. Firm performance is measured
by return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS) and
Tobin’s Q.
Table 12 presents the regression analyses results for the
impact of board secretaries on firm outcome.15 In model 1,
the result shows that board secretaries with a dual director
role positively increase the incidence of modified auditor
opinions and that board secretaries with a dual CFO role
and equity holdings decrease the possibility of modified
auditor opinions. In model 2, the result indicates that firms
are less likely to be sued in the present time if board sec-
retaries formerly received equity holdings. In model 3, the
coefficients of Accounting and EquityHoldings are signifi-
cantly positive, suggesting that board secretaries with
accounting expertise and equity holdings have a positive
effect on corporate donations. Model 4 shows that firms are
less likely to disclose CSR in annual reports when board
secretaries are politically connected. In model 5, the result
indicates that the foreign experience and party membership
of board secretaries decrease the ratio of capital expendi-
ture to cash flow, while their equity holdings increase the
ratio. In model 6, the result suggests that firms are asso-
ciated with higher discretionary accruals when board sec-
retaries have dual director roles, non-CFO dual senior roles
and lower equity holding. Models 7–9 generally suggest
that board secretaries have a positive impact on firm per-
formance, including ROA, ROS and Tobin’s Q, if they
have equity holdings. Overall, the results suggest that the
characteristics of board secretaries have a positive effect on
firm outcomes, especially when board secretaries have
equity holdings. These equity holdings could help firms to
improve corporate governance, business ethics, investment
and firm performance.
Conclusion
This study investigates board secretaries’ role in manage-
ment earnings forecasts of Chinese listed firms. Consider-
able research has been conducted to examine the influence
of CEOs, CFOs and General Counsels on management
forecast disclosure, but that of board secretary, an impor-
tant senior position responsible for disclosing corporate
information to regulators, investors and financial analysts
has been largely ignored by previous research. Given their
particular role in information disclosure, we expect that
board secretaries’ performance in forecast issuance has
significant implications for information transmission
between inside managers and outside investors, which
consequently affects the quality of information employed
by investors in their decision making. Thus, we investigate
the effects of professional ability, political connections,
dual senior titles and equity holdings of board secretaries
on the occurrence, frequency, precision and accuracy of
management earnings forecasts. Our results generally
suggest that the quality of management earnings forecasts
is positively associated with the legal expertise, accounting
expertise, foreign experience, dual senior titles and stock
15 All dependent variables in Table 12 are led 1-year.
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ownership of board secretaries and negatively related to
their membership in the Chinese Communist Party.
In addition, board secretaries with accounting expertise,
dual senior roles and equity holdings issue more bad news
forecasts and downward guidance than other forecasts. We
also show that firms make compensation and replacement
decisions for board secretaries according to their perfor-
mance in disclosing forecast and that board secretaries, on
average, receive higher compensation and have a lower
likelihood of being replaced when they deliver higher
quality forecasts to the public. Our additional analyses
provide further evidence on the significant role of board
secretaries in corporate governance, business ethics,
investment and firm performance. Overall, our study
provides the first evidence that board secretaries play an
important role in management earnings forecasts, which
adds to the literature on forecast disclosure, corporate
governance and business ethics. We encourage future
research on board secretaries to explore their other duties,
such as investor relationship management, coordinating
board meetings and legal compliance.
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